(B.F.)

SECRET -

25

April 24, 1945.

ANN 25 45

758P

Dear Mr. President:

I think it is very important that I should have a talk with you as soon as possible on a highly secret matter.

I mentioned it to you shortly after you took office but have not urged it since on account of the pressue you have been under. It, however, has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and has such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you ought to know about it without much further delay.

Faithfully yours,

Hany & Thison

Secretary of War. x25

11 8

The President, The White House.

No

DECLASSIFIED

8. O. 19692, Sec. 3(0) and 3(0) at (2)

OSD Sector, April 12, 2574

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Poston list Well

SHIFT

MARRY S TRUMAN LIMERRY
White House Central Files
Confidential

at 3:30 P. M. M. Se. Byros. adm (5 stay) Leak and I left Man open car per Beilin Tolloadd by my thro aide and Janous and sunder se cret service and military grands and preceded by a two star peneral in a closed can goth a couple of place clother was to fool ein if they wanted to do any target Practice of Coasegrence on the hey like, didn't. We renewed the Second. Connounced Division, and tred a citation on the guidon of Co. E 17th armound Engr Bn. que Collier who seemed to

Know his stuff put us on a reconsisance ese but utt site seat and no top just like a hadhun wagon minus the top on a pie truck with seatr and no hore and we drove lourly dean a wile and a half of good coldices and some million of dellaces that tool equipmentwhich had amply paid its may to Beilin. Then we went on to Beilia and sour afsolute ring. Hitleis Jolly He oseneached him all by trying to take in too much territory. He had no moials and his peop tacked Kin up Never did PSF - 322

Papers of Harry S. Trumen President's Secretary's Files

I see a mou sor sight nor in their returnion to the not dear The wort conourful paid the situation is the delided Hitlerian populace - Ofeauce the Kerseida Chare Ripage the after fodied and Koje made notohitany Hork. men of them. They have also loote d'elseig Louis ragand have sent the loot to Kuesia - But Hitler Sauce thing to It is the Yolde reserve - and it is not a an uplitting cight What is notable to put his moral thinking into practice! P5F. 322

Papers of Harry S. Trumen President's Secretary's Files

We saw old mer old women young women children from fats to teen corrying packs suching carts pulling carts readently ejected by the c Enlever and carrying what they could of their belongings no where in particular, thought of Certhage Backer prusalein, Rome, atlanta eking, Dafylon, Kinerah; Scipio Karnise, II, Titur; Lerman Lerman Jeaglis Khan alexander Daring the great-fut Hitler only de stroyed Falingad - and Derly Those for some

Mer the planet recko

PSF- 322 Chro. 12000

Papers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files

WAR DEPARTMENT

18 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAK.

SUBJECT: The Test.

- 1. This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to recite what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico.
- 2. At 0530, 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full scale test was made of the implosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion.

And what an explosion!



"he book was not dropped from

an airplane out was explosed on a platform on top of a lon-foot high steel tower.

3. The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of ThT; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were transndous blast effects.




HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
LANSING LAMONT

For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several sums in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten thousand feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Alboquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the substratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud.

4. A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverised dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seem from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated. 1500 feet away there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly guyed. It disappeared completely.

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- One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in typical 15 or 20 story skyscraper or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower which was 70 feet high, the height of a six story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steal construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed. I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards. None of us had expected it to be damaged.
 - 6. The cloud traveled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then sushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While here and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radio-

fellost

HARRY S. TRUMAN Papers of LANSING LAMONT away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government's interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was none too confortable about the situation.

- 7. For distances as such as 200 miles away, becovers core stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, radirectivity and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I now know that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible.
 - 8. Our long range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect weather favorable for our tests beginning on the sorning of the 17th and continuing for four days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 30% chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunder storms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0,400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test set-up. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held firm and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sumrise.


WEATHER 13

9. Because of bad weather, our two B-29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirtland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunder storms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. Ye still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety.

started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base of a news release as them on the inclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Commonship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved release supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light.

11. Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below:

"The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of



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
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Memorandum for Secr- ary of far

Washington and a dozen of his key assistants -- Dr. Kistiskowsky, who devoloped the nighty special explosives; Dr. Beinbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.

*For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explose because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counselling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first because it provided a better observation point and second, because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points.

broadcast of the interval remaining before the blust. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The ccientists felt that their figuring must be right and



H IX

measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by "Lord, I believe; help Thou mine umbelief." We were reaching into the umknown and we did not know that might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present—Christian, Jew and Athiest—were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people—statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers, and many others in every walk of life.

In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted "Howi" and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling rows of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief.

Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast.

"The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed "This is it!" No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists' dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great.

18 July 1945.

Memorandum for Secretary of Mar

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
new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in
that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate
their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and
never for evil.

A minuten and Harwark professor to

around Dr. Oppenheiser and embraced his with shouts of glee. Others
were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released
in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest
hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present
at the birth of a new age. The ige of Atomic Energy—and felt their
profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the
tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.

what else might happen, we now had the meens to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.

beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects begared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light



purple, violet, gray and blug. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe must poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explusion came first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, swesces roar which warned of doomsday and made us feal that we puny things were trasphenous to dare tamper with the forces heretofers reserved to The Almighty. Nords are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized."

12. My impressions of the night's high points follow:

After about an hours sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was nervous, although his mind we working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look

18 July 1945.

Memorandum for Secretary of War

stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheiser and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground.

At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000 yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Comant said he had never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Coment reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by: an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niegara Talls on his tight rope, only to se this tight rope had lasted for almost

- 10 -

three years and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it.

- 13. A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a monorandum written shortly after the explosion by br. E. O. Lawrence which may be of interest.
 - mercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque—120 miles away from the site—he overheard several airport employees discussing their reaction to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city.
 - 15. My limison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away, made the following report:

northwestern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. As the first flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately 15 seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance.

"Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of make of a whitelab-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity.

the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor."

- I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr. Harrison and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representatives.
- 17. We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.
- 18. May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratulatory cable to us and for the support and confidence which I have received from you ever since I have had this work under my charge.

19. I know that Colonel ayle will guard these papers with his | oustomary extraordinary care.

L. R. GROVES, Major General, USA.

4 Inclosures:
Sketch
Picture
Nows Release
Statement by I. O. Lawrence

WLY 16, 1945 170 course avery DRAWINGS 0 = 5:30 AM frat atomin Looking toward 80° aplain. alengalo, M.M. Slittles from 5:38 AM 3-29 flying of 30,00 1, What 15 miles away about 24, 000 / inducat. leget ging Loke toral 60° 5:42 toy dark hour per throp he, Walnut) Light gry

neetias to said. HARRY S. TRIMAN LIBRARY Papers of Harry S. Truman

President's Secretary's Files

At heabfast mitt realer Ham a sercent
in the Field artillary. He is a good ofdie and a
mice for They took him of Energy Elystett at Greco
and fleer from few Sending him home triday.
Heat I have with I man at 1:30 marked argued to
But of Hapis Net at the gate by him Chinolile Grand
of boson drawn up time tody of see Scott, it quand.
Bud placed Stay pangled Banner Inspected quand
and went in for himsel. P. m. I at alone. I mused
mandatan let is a success) Decided to tell Stalin
about it Stalin had told P m of plegam from Jap
Emperer seeking for prece Stalin also read his an
site to me It was setis factory. Believe Japs will
fold up before Ruggia corners in July 18.45 fold up before Russia corner in theatattan appear orce their horseland Istall inform Stalighted was a subject satisfactory neeting transted him to come to the US. Told him I'd send the Battlely Thiscowie pe him if hid come He said he worked to cooperate with U.S. in peace as we haden-operated in War fut it would be harder. End he was grossly misuaductood in U.S. and I was uliveradew to ad in Ruceia. Hold him that me each could help to recordy that cituation in our home concertines and that Insteaded try with all I had to do very part at home He gave me a most cordial fruite and said he would do as much in Russia. Kitter went to the conference and it so


Papers of Harry S. Trumen President's Secretary's Files

La Santa 4. · ... 1 : 12 10 HARRY S. TRIMAN LIBRARY Papers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files

July 25 1945 We met at 11 A. Mr. today That is Stalia, Churchill and the U.S. President. But I had a most important receion with Lord thost botton + general thurshall before that We have discovered the most terrible touts in the history of the world. It may be the fire distruction proplaced and Eughates Valley Era, often Noch and his fatalow like. tegstion of the atom Ou experiment in the New horizon of the explosive anded the complete discontrigation of a Theel tone to feet high created a crater 6 feet deep and 1200 feet in diameter Kurchedore a steel tone Trail away and Knocked wen town 10,000 youls away The explosion was neighe for more that too wiles and audiffe for 40 miles and more. This meason is to be used against Jopan ferreen now and Ruguet 10th There told the See of War the Streams to use it sottet military ofjectives and soldiers and eations are the toyet and not women and children Erea last the leader of the yould be the common wither count deep they terrible fourt on the old Except on the new. the + I are in accord. The target will be a purel aid. item one and use will were a warring state In went aching the gosts currender and cake hise sin sure they will not that that he will hope given their the chance of is certically a good thing for the would that Hitlers crowd on States didnot discore this exercise fout It seems to be the most territating, ere discovered, but it can be made the northwell HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files

This is the place & told Stalin chart atom Bont which was in New Mexico Hediot witnealize shat I was



US FOR ES EUROPEAN CHEATER

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

FROM: AGWAR Washington

TO: : Tripartite Conference Babslaberg, Germany

NO : WAR 41031

30 July 1945.

To the President from the Secretary of War.

gressing so rapidly that it is now essential that statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, I August. I have revised draft of statement, which I previously presented to you, in light of

- (A) Your recent ultimetum,
 - (B) Dramatic results of test and

(C) Certain minor suggestions made by British (m) of which Byrnes is aware.

While I am planning to start a copy by special courier tomorrow in the hope you can be reached, nevertheless in the event he does not reach you in time, I will appreciate having your authority to have White House release revised statement as soon as necessary.

sorry circumstances seem to require this emer-

ACTION: Gen. Vauges

(31 July 1945)

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gág

VICTORY-IN-733

EO. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (2)

CSD Later Noy 3, 1872

Papers of GEOMOE M. ELSEY

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FOREIDD

Reply to your 41011 Suggestions approved

· Berlin July 31, 1945. Dear Bees: - It was smely good to talk with you this morning at 7 A. Sy It is raid to think that if is 11 Ply. yesterday where you are. The connection was not so good this morning on account of the storms over the lettertie last day or two and while the Capacan was at a stand still because of back Joe's indisposition, the all the Byenes Thobter and aller + Buch all worked and accomplished a quait deal. rather think Mr. Station is stalling to Cauce he is not so tary one the English elections. He does not know it

pers of Marry S. Trusrtaining to Family, B ss & Personal affairs mily Correspondence F

fut I have an acc in the Lob and another one showing - so unless to has threes on two pair and I Know the has not) we are sitting all right. Course the Russian are naturally bother and they have been though too led by the Jerman, ofer und ofer ingainand you. tude. The thing I have to match with Keep our skitt clear and make no Convictedants The Poles are the other headache they have moved into East Prussin and to the Oder in Prussia and realers use are willing to go to man again they

can stay and they will stay with Bilshinki tacking - so you see un comes old man regulations again and a completely german bothed boland. Oyenes, Leaky and I Lake worked out a program I think to fit a fad situation the Sould reach a Leatation agreement in the Dig three this ofterwood, and fruit one toshowing and he on the may hunday and Surety not later than Ticken We are leaving for on Ply should England which girls us 48 hours start of leaving from autiresp. So if the get un tied how the dock Friday afternoon by Thursday well be in

Norfolk and Washington the next day of course to be a thy soonce but Jan giving you the extreme. limit. The last gouch leaves Leve Today and one will leave the foat when we get on it but willieciere mail night up to testing time Ill seve to glad to see you and the Whole House and to where a can at least go to ted without being natoles. Kies my faty. Lots lots of lose In got to head with the King King when I get to Ply month.

Part I - Psychological Marfero

 Bolow is a copy of the first leaflet (AB-11) which was dropped on Japanese cities in conjunction with the Atomic Bomb.

2. A translation of the above leaflet follows:

TO THE JAP.NESE PEOPLE:

"America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.

vised by man. A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29's can carry on a single mission. This awful fact is one for you to pender and we selemnly assure you it is grinly accurate.

"We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland. If you still have any foubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Miroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that city.

"Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you new petition the Emperor to that the war. Our President has butlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender: "So urgo that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and penceloving Japan.

"You should take steps now to coase military resistance. Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this bond and all out other superior

weapons to promptly and forcefully and the wer. "
EVACUATE YOUR CITIES

3. Below is a copy of the second leaflet (AB-12) which was dropped on Japanese cities in conjunction with the Atomic Bomb.

000 Ctr. 5200.10, June 29, 1900 RENT by S.E. Bato 12 -12 - 6.2

-60-

DOD DIF 5200.10 Dato 2 /7 //

7-0-0-3-0-1-3-5

4. .. translation of the above leaflet follows:

"ATTENTION JAPANESE " EOPLE"

EVACUATE YOUR CITIES

"Because your military leaders have rejected the thirteen part surrender declaration, two momentous events have occurred in the last few days.

"The Soviet Union, because of this rejection on the part of the military has notified your Ambassador Sate that it has declared war on your nation. Thus, all powerful countries of the world are new at war against you.

"Also because of your leaders' refusal to accept the surrender declaration that would enable Japan to honorably end this useless war, we have employed our atomic bomb.

"A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29's could have carried on a single mission. Radio Tokyo has told you that with the first use of this weapon of total destruction, Hiroshima was virtually destroyed.

"Before we use this bomb again and again to destroy every resourse of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, petition the Emperor now to end the war. Our President has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender: We argo that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and peace loving Japan.

"het at once or we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war."

EVICULTE YOUR, CITTES

DOD Dir. 5260.10 June 20, 1000 NEW by SE Gate 12 - 1.2 - 6.2

DOD Direr 5000.10 P-//-67

-51-

T-0-2-5-5-CR 3.T

THE WHITE HOUSE Washington. D. C.

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on and destroyed its usefulness to the enemy. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It had more than two thousand times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam" which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.

The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are now in production and even more powerful forms are in development.

It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.

Before 1939, it was the accepted belief of scientists that it was theoretically possible to release atomic energy. But no one knew any practical method of doing it. By 1942, however, we knew that the Germans were working feverishly to find a way to add atomic energy to the other engines of war with which they hoped to enslave the world. But they failed. We may be grateful to Providence that the Germans got the V-l's and V-2's late and in limited quantities and even more grateful that they did not get the atomic bomb at all.

The battle of the laboratories held fateful risks for us as well as the battles of the air, land and sea, and we have now won the battle of the laboratories as we have won the other battles.

Beginning in 1940, before Fearl Harbor, scientific knowledge useful in war was pooled between the United States and Great Britain, and many priceless helps to our victories

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have come from that arrangement. Under that general policy the research on the atomic bomb was begun. With American and British scientists working together we entered the race of discovery against the Germans.

The United States had available the large number of scientists of distinction in the many needed areas of knowledge. It had the tremendous industrial and financial resources necessary for the project and they could be devoted to it without undue impairment of other vital war work. In the United States the laboratory work and the production plants, on which a substantial start had already been made, would be out of reach of enemy bombing, while at that time Britain was exposed to constant air attack and was still threatened with the possibility of invasion. For these reasons Frime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed that it was wise to carry on the project here. We now have two great plants and many lesser works devoted to the production of atomic power. Employment during peak construction numbered 125,000 and over 65,000 individuals are even now engaged in operating the plants. Many have worked there for two and a half years. Few know what they have been producing. They see great quantities of material going in and they see nothing coming out of these plants, for the physical size of the explosive charge is exceedingly small. We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history -- and won.

But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different fields of science into a workable plan. And hardly less marvellous has been the capacity of industry to design, and of labor to operate, the machines and methods to do things never done before so that the brain child of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do. Both science and industry worked under the direction of the United States Army, which achieved a unique success in managing so diverse a problem in the advancement of knowledge in an amazingly short time. It is doubtful if such another combination could be got together in the world. What has been done is the greatest achievement of organized science in history. It was done under high pressure and without failure.

We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.

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It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware.

The Secretary of War, who has kept in personal touch with all phases of the project, will immediately make public a statement giving further details.

His statement will give facts concerning the sites at Oak Ridge near Knoxville, Tennessee, and at Richland near Pasco, Washington, and an installation near Santa Fe, New Mexico. Although the workers at the sites have been making materials to be used in producing the greatest destructive force in history they have not themselves been in danger beyond that of many other occupations, for the utmost care has been taken of their safety.

The fact that we can release atomic energy ushers in a new era in man's understanding of nature's forces. Atomic energy may in the future supplement the power that now comes from coal, oil, and falling water, but at present it cannot be produced on a basis to compete with them commercially. Before that comes there must be a long period of intensive research.

It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the policy of this Government to withhold from the world scientific knowledge. Normally, therefore, everything about the work with atomic energy would be made public.

But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical processes of production or all the military applications, pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction.

I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider promptly the establishment of an appropriate commission to control the production and use of atomic power within the United States. I shall give further consideration and make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace.

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STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

The recent use of the atomic bomb over Japan, which was today made known by the President, is the culmination of years of herculsan effort on the part of science and industry working in cooperation with the military authorities. This development which was carried forward by the many thousand participants with the utmost energy and the very highest sense of national duty, with the greatest secrecy and the most imperative of time schedules, probably represents the greatest achievement of the combined efforts of science, industry, labor, and the military in all history.

The military weapon which has been forged from the products of this vast undertaking has an explosive force such as to stagger the imagination. Improvements will be forthcoming shortly which will increase by several fold the present effectiveness. But more important for the long-range implications of this new weapon, is the possibility that another scale of magnitude will be evolved after considerable research and development. The scientists are confident that over a period of many years atomic bombs may well be developed which will be very much more powerful than the atomic bombs now at hand. It is abundantly clear that the possession of this weapon by the United States even in its present form should prove a tremendous aid in the shortening of the war against Japan.

The requirements of security do not permit of any revelation at this time of the exact methods by which the bombs are produced or of the nature of their action. However, in accord with its policy of keeping the people of the nation as completely informed as is consistent with national security, the War Department wishes to make known at this time, at least in broad dimension, the story behind this tremendous weapon which has been developed so effectively to hasten the end of the war. Other statements will be released which will give further details concerning the scientific and production aspects of the project and will give proper recognition to the scientists, technicians, and the men of industry and labor who have made this weapon possible.

The chain of scientific discoveries which has led to the atomic bomb began at the turn of the century when radio-activity was discovered. Until 1939 work in this field was world-wide, being carried on particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Denmark.

Before the lights went out over Europe and the advent of war imposed security restrictions, the fundamental scientific knowledge concerning atomic energy from which has been developed the atomic bomb now in use by the United States was widely known in many countries, both Allied and Axis. The war, however, ended the exchange of scientific

information on this subject and, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Canada, the status of work in this field in other countries is not fully known, but we are convinced that Japan will not be in a position to use an atomic bomb in this war. While it is known that Germany was working feverishly in an attempt to develop such a weapon, her complete defeat and occupation has now removed that source of danger. Thus it was evident when the war began that the development of atomic energy for war purposes would occur in the near future and it was a question of which nations would control the discovery.

A large number of American scientists were pressing forward the boundaries of scientific knowledge in this fertile new field at the time when American science was mobilized for war. Work on atomic fission was also in progress in the United Kingdom when the war began in Europe. A close connection was maintained between the British investigations and the work here, with a pooling of information on this as on other matters of scientific research of importance for military purposes. It was later agreed between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill that the project would be most quickly and effectively brought to fruition if all effort were concentrated in the United States, thus ensuring intimate collaboration and also avoiding duplication. As a consequence of this decision, a number of British scientists who had been working on this problem were transferred here in late 19%3, and they have from that time participated in the development of the project in the United States.

II.

Late in 1939 the possibility of using atomic energy for military purposes was brought to the attention of President Roosevelt. He appointed a committee to survey the problem. Research which had been conducted on a small scale with Navy funds was put on a full scale basis as a result of the recommendations of various scientific committees. At the end of 1941 the decision was made to go all-out on research work, and the project was put under the direction of a group of eminent American scientists in the Office of Scientific Research and Development. with all projects in operation being placed under contract with the OSRD. Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of OSRD, reported directly to the President on major developments. Meanwhile, President Roosevelt appointed a General Policy Group, which consisted of former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, General George C. Marshall, Dr. James B. Conant, and Dr. Bush. In June 1942 this group recommended a great expansion of the work and the transfer of the major part of the program to the War Department. These recommendations were approved by President Roosevelt and put into effect. Major General Leslie R. Groves was appointed by the Secretary of War to take complete executive charge of the program and was made directly responsible to him and the Chief of Staff. In order to secure continuing consideration to the

military aspects of the program, the President's General Policy Group appointed a Military Policy Committee consisting of Dr. Bush as Chairman with Dr. Conant as his alternate, Lt. General Wilhelm D. Styer, and Rear Admiral William R. Purnell. This Committee was charged with the responsibility of considering and planning military policy relating to the program including the development and manufacture of material, the production of atomic fission bombs, and their use as a weapon.


Although there were still numerous unsolved problems concerning the several theoretically possible methods of producing explosive material, nevertheless, in view of the tremendous pressure of time it was decided in December 1942 to proceed with the construction of large scale plants. Two of these are located at the Clinton Engineer Works in Tennessee and a third is located at the Hanford Engineer Works in the State of Washington. The decision to embark on large scale production at such an early stage was, of course, a gamble, but as is so necessary in war a calculated risk was taken and the risk paid off.

The Clinton Engineer Works is located on a Government reservation of some 59,000 acres eighteen miles west of Knoxville, Tennessee. The large size and isolated location of this site was made necessary by the need for security and for safety against possible, but then unknown, hazards. A Government-owned and operated city, named Oak Ridge, was established within the reservation to accommodate the people working on the project. They live under normal conditions in modest houses, dermitories, hutments, and trailers, and have for their use all the religious, recreational, educational, medical, and other facilities of a modern small city. The total population of Oak Ridge is approximately 78,000 and consists of construction workers and plant operators and their immediate families; others live in immediately surrounding communities.

The Hanford Engineer Works is located on a Government reservation of 430,000 acres in an isolated area fifteen miles northwest of Pasco, Washington. Here is situated a Government-owned and operated town called Richland with a population of approximately 17,000 consisting of plant operators and their immediate families. As in the case of the site in Tennessee, consideration of security and safety necessitated placing this site in an isolated area. Living conditions in Richland are similar to those in Oak Ridge.

A special laboratory dealing with the many technical problems involved in putting the components together into an effective bomb is located in an isolated area in the vicinity of Santa Fe, New Mexico. This laboratory has been planned, organized, and directed by Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. The development of the bomb itself has been largely due to his genius and the inspiration and leadership he has given to his associates.

Certain other manufacturing plants much smaller in scale are located in the United States and in Canada for essential production of



needed materials. Laboratories at the Universities of Columbia, Chicago, and California, Iova State College, and at other schools as well as certain industrial laboratories have contributed materially in carrying on research and in developing special equipment, materials, and processes for the project. A laboratory has been established in Canada and a pilot plant for the manufacture of material is being built. This work is being carried on by the Canadian Government with assistance from, and appropriate liaison with, the United States and the United Kingdom.


While space does not permit of a complete listing of the industrial concerns which have contributed so signally to the success of the project, mention should be made of a few. The du Pont de Nemours Company designed and constructed the Hanford installations in Washington and operate them. A special subsidiary of the M. W. Kellogg Company of New York designed one of the plants at Clinton, which was constructed by the J. A. Jones Company and is operated by the Union Carbide and Carbon Company. The second plant at Clinton was designed and constructed by the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation of Boston and is operated by the Tennessee Eastman Company. Equipment was supplied by almost all of the important firms in the United States, including Allis-Chalmers, Chrysler, General Electric, and Westinghouse. These are only a few of the literally thousands of firms, both large and small, which have contributed to the success of the program. It is hoped that one day it will be possible to reveal in greater detail the contributions made by industry to the successful development of this weapon.

Behind these concrete achievements lie the tremendous contributions of American science. No praise is too great for the unstinting efforts, brilliant achievements, and complete devotion to the national interest of the scientists of this country. Mowhere else in the worl has science performed so successfully in time of war. All the men of science who have cooperated effectively with industry and the military authorities in bringing the project of fruition merit the very highest expression of gratitude from the people of the nation.

In the War Department the main responsibility for the successful prosecution of the program rests with Major General Leslie R. Groves. His record of performance in securing the effective development of this weapon for our armed forces in so short a period of time has been truly outstanding and merits the very highest commendation.

III.

From the outset extracrdinary secrecy and security measures have surrounded the project. This was personally ordered by President Roosevelt and his orders have been strictly complied with. The work has been completely compartmentalized so that while many thousands of people have been associated with the program in one way or another no one has been given more information concerning it than was absolutely necessary



to his particular job. As a result only a few highly placed persons in Government and science know the entire story. It was inevitable, of course, that public curiosity would be aroused concerning so large a project and that citizens would make inquiries of Members of Congress. In such instances the Members of Congress have been most cooperative and have accepted in good faith the statement of the War Department that military security precluded any disclosure of detailed information.

In the appropriation of funds, the Congress has accepted the assurances of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff that the appropriations made were absolutely essential to national security. The War Department is confident that the Congress will agree that its faith was not a mistake. Because it has not been possible for Congress to keep a close check on the expenditure of the funds appropriated for the project which to June 30, 1945, amounted to \$1,950,000,000, key scientific phases of the work have been reviewed from time to time by eminently qualified scientists and industrial leaders in order to be certain that the expenditures were varranted by the potentialities of the program.


The press and radio of the nation, as in so many other instances, have complied wholeheartedly with the requests of the Office of Censorship that publicity on any phase of this subject be suppressed.

IV.

In order to bring the project to fruition as quickly as possible, it was decided in August 1943 to establish a Combined Policy Committee with the following membership: Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Dr. Vannevar Bush, and Dr. James B. Conant, for the United States; Field Marshal Sir John Dill and Colonel J. J. Llewellin, for the United Kingdom;* and Mr. C. D. Howe, for Canada. The Committee is responsible for the broad direction of the project as between the countries. Interchange of information has been provided for within certain limits. In the field of scientific research and development full interchange is maintained between those working in the same sections of the field; in matters of design, construction and operation of large scale plants information is exchanged only when such exchange will hasten the completion of weapons for use in the present var. All these arrangements are subject to the approval of the Combined Policy Committee. The United States members have had as their scientific adviser Dr. Richard C. Tolman; the Eritish members, Sir James Chadwick; and the Canadian member, Dean C. J. Mackenzie.

It was early recognized that in order to make certain that this tremendous weapon would not fall into the hands of the enemy prompt

^{*} Colonel Llewellin was replaced by Sir Ronald I. Campbell in December 1943 and the latter, in turn, by the Earl of Halifax. The late Field Marshal Sir John Dill was replaced by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson early in 1945.




action should be taken to control patents in the field and to secure control over the ore which is indispensable to the process. Substantial patent control has been accomplished in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. In each country all personnel engaged in the work, both scientific and industrial, are required to assign their entire rights to any inventions in this field to their respective governments. Arrangements have been made for appropriate patent exchange in instances where inventions are made by nationals of one country working in the territory of another. Such patent rights, interests, and titles as are exchanged, however, are held in a fiduciary sense subject to settlement at a later date on mutually satisfactory terms. All patent actions taken are surrounded by all safeguards necessary for the security of the project. At the present stage of development of the science of atomic fission, uranium is the ore essential to the production of the weapon. Steps have been taken, and continue to be taken, to assure us of adequate supplies of this mineral.

v.

Atomic fission holds great promise for sweeping developments by which our civilization may be enriched when peace comes, but the over-riding necessities of war have precluded the full exploration of peacetime applications of this new knowledge. With the evidence presently at hand, however, it appears inevitable that many useful contributions to the well-being of mankind will ultimately flow from these discoveries when the world situation makes it possible for science and industry to concentrate on these aspects.

The fact that atomic energy can now be released on a large scale in an atomic bomb raises the question of the prospect of using this energy for peaceful industrial purposes. Already in the course of producing one of the elements much energy is being released, not explosively but in regulated amounts. This energy, however, is in the form of heat at a temperature too low to make practicable the operation of a conventional power plant. It will be a matter of much further research and development to design machines for the conversion of atomic energy into useful power. How long this will take no one can predict but it will certainly be a period of many years. Furthermore, there are many economic considerations to be taken into account before we can say to what extent atomic energy will supplement coal, oil, and water as fundamental sources of power in industry in this or any other country. We are at the threshold of a new industrial art which will take many years and much expenditure of money to develop.

Because of the widespread knowledge and interest in this subject even before the war, there is no possibility of avoiding the risks inherent in this knowledge by any long-term policy of secrecy. Mindful of these considerations as well as the grave problems that arise concerning the control of the weapon and the implications of this science for the peace of the world, the Secretary of War, with the approval of the President,



has appointed an Interim Committee to consider these matters. Membership of the Committee is as follows: The Secretary of War, Chairman; the Honorable James F. Byrnes, now Secretary of State; the Honorable Ralph A. Bard, former Under Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington; Dr. James B. Comant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee and President of Harvard University; Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chief of the Office of Field Service in the Office of Scientific Research and Development and President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Mr. George L. Harrison, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War and President of the New York Life Insurance Company. Mr. Harrison is alternate Chairman of the Committee.

The Committee is charged with the responsibility of formulating recommendations to the President concerning the post-war organization that should be established to direct and control the future course of the United States in this field both with regard to the research and developmental aspects of the entire field and to its military applications. It will make recommendations with regard to the problems of both national and international control. In its consideration of these questions, the Committee has had the benefit of the views of the scientists who have participated in the project. These views have been brought to the attention of the Committee by an advisory group selected from the leading physicists of the country who have been most active on this subject. This group is composed of Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, Dr. A. H. Compton, and Dr. Enrico Fermi. The Interim Committee has also consulted the representatives of those industries which have been most closely connected with the multitude of problems that have been faced in the production phases of the project. Every effort is being bent toward assuring that this weapon and the new field of science that stands behind it will be employed wisely in the interests of the security of peace-loving nations and the well-being of the world.

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THE PRESIDENT

(PERSONAL DELIVERY) THE WHITE HOUSE

PERMIT ME TO RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT WE CEASE OUR EFFORTS TO CAJOLE JAPAN INTO SURRENBERING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POTSDAM. DECLARATION. LET US CARRY THE WAR TO THEM UNTIL THEY BEG US TO ACCEPT THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. THE FOUL ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR BROUGHT US INTO WAR AND I AM UNABLE TO SEE ANY VALID REASON WHY WE SHOULD BE SO MUCH MORE CONSIDERATE AND LENIENT IN DEALING WITH JAPAN THAN WITH GERMANY. I EARNESTLY INSIST JAPAN SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS HARSHLY AS GERMANY AND THAT SHE

SHOULD NOT BE THE BENEFICIARY OF A SOFT PEACE. THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING MANY SOUND THINKERS WHO HAVE INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ORIENT, DO NOT AGREE WITH MR. GREW IN HIS ATTITUDE THAT THERE IS ANY THING SACROSANCT ABOUT HIROHITO. HE SHOULD GO. WE HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO SHINTOLISM. THE COMPTENT-UOUS ANSWER OF THE JAPS TO THE POTSDAM ULTIMATUM JUSTIFIES A REVISION OF THAT DOCUMENT AND STERNER PEACE TERMS.

IF WE DO NOT HAVE AVAILABLE A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF ATOMIC 4022

I ALSO HOPE THAT YOU WILL ISSUE ORDERS FORBIDDING THE OFFICERS IN COMMAND OF OUR AIR FORCES FROM WARNING JAP CITIES THAT THEY WILL BE ATTACKED. THESE GENERALS DO NOT FLY OVER JAPAN AND THIS SHOWMANSHIP CAN ONLY RESULT IN THE UNNECESSARY LOSS OF MANY FINE BOYS IN OUR AIR FORCE AS WELL AS OUR HELPLESS PRISONERS IN THE HANDS OF THE JAPANESE, INCLUDING THE SURVIVORS OF THE MARCH OF DEATH ON BATAAN WHO ARE CERTAIN TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE CITIES THAT HAVE BEEN WARNED.

THIS WAS A TOTAL WAR AS LONG AS OUR ENEMIES HELD ALL OF THE CARDS. WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE THE RULES NOW, AFTER THE BLOOD, TREASURE AND ENTERPRISE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE GIVEN US THE UPPER HAND. OUR PEOPLE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THAT THE JAPANESE STRUCK US THE FIRST BLOW IN THIS WAR WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST WARNING. THEY BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRIKE THE JAPANESE UNTIL THEY

ARE BROUGHT GROVELING TO THEIR KNEES. WE SHOULD CEASE OUR APPEALS TO JAPAN TO SUE FOR PEACE. THE NEXT PLEA FOR PEACE SHOULD COME FROM AN UTTERLY DESTROYED TOKYO. WELCOME EACK HOME. WITH ASSURAN-CES OF ESTEEM RICHARD B RUSSELL US SENATOR.

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THE STREET

August 9, 1945

Dear Dicks

I read your telegram of August seventh with

I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can't bring syself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner.

For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations because of the "pigheadedness" of the leaders of a nation and, for your information, I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary. It do it unless it is absolutely necessary. It is my opinion that after the Russians enter in my opinion that after the Russians enter into mar the Japanese will very shortly fold up.

My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan-

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Winder
Georgia

HARRY S. TRUNAN LIER

Papers of Harry S. T Official File WUX NEWYORK NY AUG 9 1945 1046A


HONORABLE HARRY S TRUMAN

MANY CHRISTIANS DEEPLY DISTURBED OVER USE OF ATOMIC BOMES
AGAINST JAPANESE CITIES BECAUSE OF THEIR NECESSARILY
INDISCRIMINATE DESTRUCTIVE EFFORTS AND BECAUSE THEIR USE SETS
ENTREMELY DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE OF MANKIND. SISKOP
OWNAM PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND JOHN FOSTER DULES CHAIRMAN
OF ITS COMMISSION ON A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE ARE PREPARING
STATEMENT FOR PROBABLE RELEASE TOMORROW URGING THAT ATOMIC
BOMES BE REGARDED AS TRUST FOR HUMANITY AND THAT JAPANESE



NATION EE GIVEN GENUINE OPPORTUNITY AND TIME TO VERIFY FACTS
ALOUT NEW BOME AND TO ACCEPT SURRENDERS TERMS. RESPECTFULLY
URGE THAT AMPLE OPPORTUNITY BE GIVEN JAPAN TO RECONSIDER
ULTIMATUM SEFCRE ANY FURTHER DEVASTATION BY ATOMIC BOME IS
VISITED UPON HER PEOPLE

FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT GENERAL SECRETARY.



August 11, 1945

My dear Mr. Cavert:

I appreciated very much your telegram of August minth.

Nobody is more disturbed over the use of atomic bombs than I am but I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them.

x PP7 185 x 197- mise x 400 Hawaii Na de.

When you have to deal with a beast you have x197 to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Mr. Samuel McCrea Cavert

General Secretary
Federal Council of
The Churches of Christ in America
New York City, New York



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Papers of Harry S. Trumen Official File SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 6, 1945

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MENORANDUM FOR: HOW. JAMES BYANTS, Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose herewith correspondence addressed to me by Mr. Leo Szilard of the Metallurgical Laboratory, Chicago, Illinois.

I believe you are familiar with these papers.

I will appreciate it very much if you will be good enough to write him direct, stating that his correspondence had been brought to your attention by this office.

MILM

Thank you.

PATTHET J! CONKELLY Secretary to the President.

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Metallurgical Laboratory

P.O. BOX 5207 CHICAGO BO, ILLINOIS

August 17, 1945

Mr. Matthew J. Connelly The White House

944

Dear Mr. Connelly:

Washington, D. C.

When Mr. Bartky and I called on you on May 25, you were kind enough to arrange an interview with Mr. Byrnes. H. C. Urey of Columbia University, Walter Bartky of the University of Chicago, and I saw Byrnes on May 28 and submitted to him a memorandum dated Spring, 1945 which was originally prepared for Mr. Roosevelt and which you have read. We are very grateful to you for the opportunity to present our views to Mr. Byrnes.

The enclosed envelope contains Mr. Einstein's letter, returned by Mr. Byrnes for transmittal to your office, and a copy of the memorandum which we left with Mr. Byrnes. You had previously seen both of these documents and they are merely transmitted for your files.

Enclosed also is the text of a petition which was signed by 67 scientists working in this Laboratory. It may not have crossed your desk since it had been transmitted in July via the War Department. Some of those who signed this petition have asked me that its text be now made public; and I wondered whether you would be good enough to let me know by August 24 if you considered its publication undesirable.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

ARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY MISCELLANEOUS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT FILE

112 Mercer Street Princeton, New Jersey Narch 25, 1945

The Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt The President of the United States The White House Washington, D. C.

Sir:


I am writing you to introduce Dr. L. Szilard who proposes to submit to you certain considerations and recommendations. Unusual circumstances which I shall describe further below induce me to take this action in spite of the fact that I do not know the substance of the considerations and recommendations which Dr. Szilard proposes to submit to you.

In the summer of 1939 Dr. Szilard put before me his views concerning the potential importance of uranium for national defense. He was greatly disturbed by the potentialities involved and anxious that the United States Government be advised of them as soon as possible. Dr. Szilard, who is one of the discoverers of the neutron emission of uranium on which all present work on uranium is based, described to me a specific system which he devised and which he thought would make it possible to set up a chain reaction in unseparated uranium in the immediate future. Having known him for over twenty years both from his scientific work and personally, I have much confidence in his judgment and it was on the basis of his judgment as well as my own that I took the liberty to approach you in connection with this subject. You responded to my letter dated August 2, 1939 by the appointment of a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Briggs and thus started the Government's activity in this field.

The terms of secrecy under which Dr. Szilard is working at present do not permit him to give me information about his work; however, I understand that he now is greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between scientists who are doing this work and those members of your Cabinet who are responsible for formulating policy. In the circumstances I consider it my duty to give Dr. Szilard this introduction and I wish to express the hope that you will be able to give his presentation of the case your personal attention.

Very truly yours,

1. Vintein .



EO. 1.1634, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

BY MET TOKE, HADE BUILD 12:7:

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1945.


Aguar 1,

Dear Mr. President:

In handing you today my nemorandum about our relations with Russia in respect to the atomic bomb, I am not unmindful of the fact that when in Potsdam I talked with you about the question whother we could be safe in sharing the atomic bomb with Russia while she was still a police state and before she put into effect provisions assuring personal rights of liberty to the individual citizen.


I still recognize the difficulty and am still convinced of the importance of the ultimate importance of a change in Russian attitude toward individual liberty but I have come to the comclusion that it would not be possible to use our possession of the atomic bomb as a direct lever to produce the change. I have become convinced that any denand by us for an internal change in Russia as a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be so resented that it would make the objective we have in wiew less probable.

I believe that the change in attitude toward the individual in Russia will come slowly and gradually and I am satisfied that we should not delay our approach to Russia in the matter of the atomic bomb until that process has been completed. My reasons



HARRY S. TRIMAN LIBRARY

-2-



are set forth in the memorandum I am handing you today. Furthermore, I believe that this long process of change in Russia is more likely to be expedited by the closer relationship in the matter of the atomic bomb which I suggest and the trust and confidence that I believe would be inspired by the method of approach which I have outlined.

Faithfully yours,

News, L Stimson


Secretary of War.

The President,

The White House.

SECRET

Papers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. (14552, Soc. 3/E) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD letter, May 3, 1972

By 657-775-... KARS Date 2, 22, 22

11 September 1945


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bombs

The advent of the atomic bomb has stimulated great military and probably even greater political interest throughout the civilized world. In a world atmosphere already extremely sensitive to power, the introduction of this weapon has profoundly affected political considerations in all sections of the globe.

In many quarters it has been interpreted as a substantial offset to the growth of Russian influence on the continent. We can be certain that the Sowiet government has sensed this tendency and the temptation will be strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time. Britain in effect already has the status of a partner with us in the development of this weapon. Accordingly, unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust, we are going to maintain the Anglo-Saxon bloc over against the Soviet in the possession of this weapon. Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviet toward the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.





TOP SECRET


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
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If we feel, as I assume we must, that civilization demands that some day we shall arrive at a satisfactory international arrangement respecting the control of this new force, the question then is how long we can afford to enjoy our momentary superiority in the hope of achieving our immediate peace council objectives.

Whether Russia gets control of the necessary secrets of production in a minimum of say four years or a maximum of twenty years is not nearly as important to the world and civilization as to make sure that when they do get it they are willing and cooperative partners among the peace loving nations of the world. It is true that if we approach them now, as I would propose, we may be gambling on their good faith and risk their getting into production of bombs a little sooner than they would otherwise.

satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally important, right not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they become immediately emergent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach then







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
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now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and notives will increase. It will inspire them to greater efforts in an all out effort to solve the problem. If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much less likely that we will ever get the kind of covenant we may desperately need in the future. This risk is, I believe, greater than the other, inasmuch as our objective must be to get the best kind of international bargain we can — one that has some chance of being kept and saving civilization not for five or for twenty years, but forever.

The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust.

tating military weapon to be assimilated into our pattern of international relations, it would be one thing. We could then follow the old custom of secrecy and nationalistic military superiority relying on international caution to prescribe the future use of the weapon as we did with gas. But I think the bumb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts. I think it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical





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power for destructiveness and his psychological power of selfcentrol and group centrol -- his noral power. If so, our method of approach to the Russians is a question of the most vital importence in the evolution of human progress.

Since the crux of the problem is Russia, any contemplated action leading to the control of this weapon should be primarily directed to Russia. It is my judgment that the Soviet would be more apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach made by the United States on this subject than would be the case if the approach were made as a part of a general international scheme, or if the approach were made after a succession of express or implied threats or near threats in our peace negotiations.

My idea of an approach to the Soviets would be a direct proposal after discussion with the British that we would be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and so far as possible to direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we would be willing to impound what bombs we now



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
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
have in the United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three Governments agree to that use. We might also consider including in the arrangement a covenant with the U. K. and the Soviets providing for the exchange of benefits of future developments whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes.


I would make such an approach just as soon as our immediate political considerations make it appropriate.

I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considerations the importance of taking this action with Russia as a proposal of the United States - backed by Great Britain - but peculiarly the proposal of the United States. Action of any international group of nations, including many small nations who have not demonstrated their potential power or responsibility in this war would not, in my opinion, be taken seriously by the Soviets. The loose debates which would surround such proposal, if put before a conference of nations, would provoke but scant favor from the Soviet. As I say, I think this is the most important point in the program.

After the nations which have won this war have agreed to it, there will be ample time to introduce France and China into the covenants and finally to incorporate the agreement into the scheme of the United Nations. The use of this bomb has been accepted by







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the world as the result of the initiative and productive capacity of the United States, and I think this factor is a most potent lever toward having our proposals accepted by the Soviets, whereas I am most skeptical of obtaining any tangible results by way of any international debate. I urge this method as the most realistic means of accomplishing this vitally important step in the history of the world.

Secretary of War.



UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

20 June 1946

My dear Mr President:

Within the next fortnight the Survey will subsit to you a sunnary report on the study of air power in the Pacific war requested by your letter of 15 August 1945.

The Survey is submitting herewith a separate and more detailed report on the effects of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the next few days this will be followed by a separate report on the events which led to the Japanese surrender.

The report on the atomic bombings has been coordinated with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Wavy and approved by them in all respects. It has also been cleared by the Manhattan District for security.

In view of these clearances with respect to policies and security, it is suggested that should the report neet with your approval it would be appropriate for your release to the public in accordance with the views you expressed in our last conversation.

Respectfully submitted

Franklin D'Olier

Franklin D'Olier Chairman

The President The White House Rashington D C the war continued many more weeks, whether sanctioned by the censors or spread by the ever-active rumor channels so common in the country.

It is apperent that the effect of the atomic bombings on the confidence of the Japanese civilian population was remarkably local-ized. Outside of the target cities, it was subordinate to other demoralizing experiences. The effect which it did have was probably due largely to the number of casualties and the nature of the injuries received. These consequences were in part the result of surprise and the vulnerability of the raid defense system. Properly enforced warnings, precautions, and an emergency care organization of the scale of the bomb's effects night have reduced casualties and, therefore, the effects on marale.

Even in the target cities, it must be emphasized, the atomic bombs did not uniformly destroy the Japanese fighting spirit. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when compared with other Japanese cities, were not more defeatist than the average. The bombs were tramendous personal catastrophes to the survivors, but neither time nor understanding of the revolutionary threat of the atomic bomb permitted them to see in these personal catastrophes a final blow to Japan's prospects for victory or negotiated peace.

3. The Japanese Decision to Surrender.

The further question of the effects of the bombs on the morale of the Japanese leaders and their decision to abandon the war is tied up with other factors. The atomic bomb had more effect on the thinking of government leaders than on the morale of the rank and file of civilians cutside of the target areas. It cannot be said, however, that the stomic bomb comvinced the leaders who effected the peace of the necessity of surrender. The decision to seek ways and means to terminate the war, influenced in part by knowledge of the low state of popular morale, had been taken in May, 1945 by the Supreme War Guidance Council.

As early as the spring of 1944 a group of former prime ministers and others close to the Emperor had been making efforts toward bringing the war to an end. This group, including such men as Admiral Okada, Admiral Yonai, Prince Konoye, and Marquis Kido, had been influential in effecting Tojo's resignation and in making Admiral Suzuki Prime Winister after Koiso's fall. Even in the Suzuki Cabinet, however, agreement was far from unanimous. The Navy Winister, Admiral Yonai, was sympathetic, but the War Minister, General Anami, usually represented the fight-to-the-end policy of the Army. In the Supreme War Guidance Council, a scrty of inner cabinet, his adherence to that line was further assured by the participation of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, so that on the peace issue this organization was evenly divided, with these three opposing the Prime



Minister, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister. At any time military (especially Army) dissatisfaction with the Cabinet might have eventuated at least in its fall and possibly in the "liquidation" of the anti-war members.

Thus the problem facing the peace leaders in the government was to bring about a surrender despite the hesitation of the War Minister and the opposition of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff. This had to be done, moreover, without precipitating counter measures by the Army which would eliminate the entire peace group. This was done ultimately by bringing the Emperor actively into the decision to accept the Potsdam terms. So long as the Emperor openly supported such a policy and could be presented to the country as doing so, the military, which had fostered and lived on the idea of complete obedience to the Emperor, could not effectively rebel.

A preliminary step in this direction had been taken at the Imperial Conference on 26 June. At this meeting, the Emperor, taking an active part despite his custom to the contrary, stated that he desired the development of a plan to end the war as well as one to defend the home islands. This was followed by a renewal of earlier efforts to get the Soviet Union to intercede with the United States, which were effectively answered by the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July and the Russian declaration of war on 9 August.

The atomic bombings considerably speeded up these political naneuverings within the government. This in itself was partly a morale effect, since there is ample evidence that members of the Cabinet were worried by the prospect of further atomic bombings, especially on the remains of Tokyo. The bombs did not convince the military that defense of the home islands was impossible, if their behavior in government councils is adequate testimony. It did permit the Government to say, however, that no army without the weapon could possibly resist an enemy who had it, thus saving "face" for the Army leaders and not reflecting on the competence of Japanese industrialists or the valor of the Japanese soldier. In the Supreme War Guidance Council voting remained divided, with the War Minister and the two Chiefs of Staff unwilling to accept unconditional surrender. There seems little doubt, however, that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki weakened their inclination to oppose the peace group.

The peace effort culminated in an Imperial conference held on the night of 9 August and continued into the early hours of 10 August, for which the stage was set by the atomic bomb and the Russian war declaration. At this meeting the Emperor, again breaking his customary silence, stated specifically that he wanted acceptance of the Potsdam terms.

A quip was current in high government circles at this time that the atomic bomb was the real Kanikaze, since it saved Japan from



My dear Doctor Compton:

I appreciated very such your sending so the article from The Atlantic Bonthly - If The Atomic Bonth Had Not Been Used. It is the first sensible statement I have seen on the subject.

I have also asked the former Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to assemble the facts and get them into record form and, I think, he is doing that.

Your statement in The Atlantic Monthly is a fair analysis of the situation except that the final decision had to be made by the President, and was made offers a complete survey of the whole situation had been made. The educations reached tore substantially those set out in your article.

The Japanese were given fair warming and sere affered the terms, which they finally accepted, well in advance of the dropping of the bomb. I imaging the bomb caused them to accept the terms.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Dr. Karl T. Compton President Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge 39, Massachusetts





IF THE ATOMIC BOMB HAD NOT BEEN USED

by KARL T. COMPTON

About a week after V-J Day I was one of a small group of scientists and engineers interrogating an intelligent, well-informed Japanese Army officer in Yokohama. We asked him what, in his opinion, would have been the next major move if the war had continued. He replied: "You would probably have tried to invade our homeland with a landing operation on Kyushu about November 1. I think the attack would have been made on such and such beaches."

"Could you have repelled this landing?" we asked, and he answered: "It would have been a very desperate fight, but I do not think we could

have stopped you."
"What would have happened then?" we asked.

He replied: "We would have kept on fighting until all Japanese were killed, but we would not have been defeated," by which he meant that they would not have been disgraced by surrender.

It is easy now, after the event, to look back and say that Japan was already a beaten nation, and to ask what therefore was the justification for the use of the atomic bomb to kill so many thousands of helpless Japanese in this inhuman way; furthermore, should we not better have kept it to ourselves as a secret weapon for future use, if necessary? This argument has been advanced often, but it seems to me utterly fallacious.

I had, perhaps, an unusual opportunity to know the pertinent facts from several angles, yet I was without responsibility for any of the decisions. I can therefore speak without doing so defensively. While my role in the atomic bomb development was a very minor one, I was a member of the group called together by Secretary of War Stimson to assist him in plans for its test, use, and subsequent handling. Then, shortly before Hiroshima, I became attached to General MacArthur in Manila, and lived for two months with his staff. In this way

I learned something of the invasion plans and of the sincere conviction of these best-informed officers that a desperate and costly struggle was still ahead. Finally, I spent the first month after V-J Day in Japan, where I could ascertain at first hand both the physical and the psychological state of that country. Some of the Japanese whom I consulted were my scientific and personal friends of long

From this background I believe, with complete conviction, that the use of the atomic bemb saved hundreds of thousands — perhaps several millions — of lives, both American and Japanese; that without its use the war would have continued for many months; that no one of good conscience knowing, as Secretary Stimson and the Chiefs of Staff did, what was probably ahead and what the atomic bomb might accomplish could have made any different decision. Let some of the facts speak for themselves.

Was the use of the atomic bomb inhusans? All war is inhuman. Here are some comparisons of the atomic bombing with conventional bombing. At Hiroshima the atomic bomb killed about 80,000 people, pulverized about five square miles, and wrecked an additional ten square miles of the city, with decreasing damage out to seven or eight miles from the center. At Nagasaki the fatal casualties were 45,000 and the area wrecked was considerably smaller than at Hiroshima because of the configuration of the city.

Compare this with the results of two B-29 incendiary raids over Tokyo. One of these raids killed about 125,000 people, the other nearly 100,000.

Of the 210 square miles of greater Tokyo, 85 square miles of the densest part was destroyed as completely, for all practical purposes, as were the centers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; about half the buildings were destroyed in the remaining 125 square miles; the number of people driven homeless out of Tokyo was considerably larger than the population of greater Chicago. These figures are based on information given us in Tokyo and on a detailed study of the air reconnaissance maps. They may be somewhat in error but are certainly of the right order of magnitude.

A physicist and the first of three brothers to become college presidents, Kara T. Compros has been the head of Massachasetts Institute of Technology since 1930. During the war he served in a number of war projects in close association with Dr. Vannevar Bush and President James B. Conant of Harvard. He was a member of the National Defense Research Committee, Chief of the Office of Field Service of the OSRD, and an observer on General MocArthur's staff directly after V-J Day.

'Was Japan already beaten before the atomic bomb? The answer is certainly "yes" in the sense that the fortunes of war had turned against her. The answer is "no" in the sense that she was still fighting desperately and there was every reason to believe that she would continue to do so; and this is the only answer that has any practical significance.

General MacArthur's staff anticipated about 50,000 American casualties and several times that number of Japanese casualties in the November 1 operation to establish the initial beachheads on Kyushu. After that they expected a far more costly struggle before the Japanese homeland was subdued. There was every reason to think that the Japaneso would defend their homeland with even greater fanaticism than when they fought to the death on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. No American soldier who survived the bloody struggles on these islands has much sympathy with the view that battle with the Japanese was over as soon as it was clear that their ultimate situation was hopeless. No, there was every reason to expect a terrible struggle long after the point at which some people can now look back and say, "Japan was already beaten."

A month after our occupation I heard General MacArthur say that even then, if the Japanese government lost control over its people and the millions of former Japanese soldiers took to guerrilla warfare in the mountains, it could take a million American troops ten years to master the situation.

That this was not an impossibility is shown by the following fact, which I have not seen reported. We recall the long period of nearly three weeks between the Japanese offer to surrender and the actual surrender on September 2. This was needed in order to arrange details of the surrender and occupation and to permit the Japanese government to prepare its people to accept the capitulation. It is not generally realized that there was threat of a revolt against the government, led by an Army group supported by the peasants, to seize control and continue the war. For several days it was touch and go as to whether the people would follow their government in surrender.

The bulk of the Japanese people did not consider themselves beaten; in fact they believed they were winning in spite of the terrible punishment they had taken. They watched the paper balloons take off and float eastward in the wind, confident that these were carrying a terrible retribution to the United States in revenge for our air raids.

We gained a vivid insight into the state of knowledge and morale of the ordinary Japanese soldier from a young private who had served through the

from a young private who had served through the war in the Japanese Army. He had lived since bubyhood in America, and had graduated in 1940 from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This lad, thoroughly American in outlook, had gone with his family to visit relatives shortly after his graduation. They were caught in the mobilization and he was drafted into the Army.

This young Japanese told us that all his fellow soldiers believed that Japan was winning the war. To them the losses of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were parts of a grand strategy to lure the American forces closer and closer to the homeland, until they could be pounced upon and utterly annihilated. He himself had come to have some doubts as a result of various inconsistencies in official reports. Also be had seen the Ford assembly line in operation and knew that Japan could not match America in war production. But none of the soldiers had any inkling of the true situation until one night, at ten-thirty, his regiment was called to hear the reading of the surrender proclamation.

Did the atomic bomb bring about the end of the wor? That it would do so was the calculated gamble and hope of Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, and their associates. The facts are these. On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Ultimatum called on Japan to surrender unconditionally. On July 29 Premier Suzuki issued a statement, purportedly at a cabinet press conference, scorning as unworthy of official notice the surrender ultimatum, and emphasizing the increasing rate of Japanese aircraft production. Eight days later, on August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima; the second was dropped on August 9 on Nagasaki; on the following day, August 10, Japan declared its intention to surrender, and on August 14 accepted the Potsdam terms.

On the basis of these facts, I cannot believe that, without the atomic bomb, the surrender would have come without a great deal more of costly struggle and bloodshed.

Exactly what role the atomic bomb played will always allow some scope for conjecture. A survey has shown that it did not have much immediate effect on the common people far from the two bombed cities; they knew little or nothing of it. The even more disastrous conventional bombing of Tokyo and other cities had not brought the people into the mood to surrender.

The evidence points to a combination of factors. (1) Some of the more informed and intelligent elements in Japanese official circles realized that they were fighting a losing battle and that complete destruction lay ahead if the war continued. These elements, however, were not powerful enough to sway the situation against the dominating Army organization, backed by the profiteering industrialists, the peasants, and the ignorant masses. (2) The atomic bomb introduced a dramatic new element into the situation, which strengthened the hands of those who sought peace and provided a face-saving argument for those who had hitherto advocated continued war. (3) When the second atomic bomb was dropped, it became clear that this was not an isolated weapon, but that there were. others to follow. With dread prospect of a deluge of these terrible bombs and no possibility of preventing them, the argument for surrender was made con-

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIERARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files vincing. This I believe to be the true picture of the effect of the atomic bomb in bringing the war to a sudden end, with Japan's unconditional surrender.

If the atomic bomb had not been used, evidence like that I have cited points to the practical certainty that there would have been many more menths of death and destruction on an enormous scale. Also the early timing of its use was fortunate for a reason which could not have been anticipated. If the invasion plans had proceeded as scheduled, October, 1945, would have seen Okinawa covered with airplanes and its harbors crowded with landing craft poised for the attack. The typhoon which struck Okinawa in that month would have wrecked the invasion plans with a military disaster comparable to Pearl Harbor.

These are some of the facts which lead those who know them, and especially those who had to base decisions on them, to feel that there is much delusion and wishful thinking among those afterthe-event strategists who now deplore the use of the atomic bomb on the ground that its use was inhuman or that it was unnecessary because Japan was already beaten. And it was not one atomic bomb, or two, which brought surrender; it was the experience of what an atomic bomb will actually do to a community, plus the dread of many more. that was effective.

If 500 bombers could wreak such destruction on Tokyo, what will 500 bombers, each carrying an atomic bomb, do to the City of Tomorrow? It is this deadly prospect which now lends such force to the two basic policies of our nation on this subject: (1) We must strive generously and with all our ability to promote the United Nations' effort to assure future peace between nations; but we must not lightly surrender the atomic bomb as a means for our own defense. (2) We should surrender or share it only when there is adopted an international plan to enforce peace in which we can have great confidence.

NUREMBERG IN RETROSPECT

by CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR.

1

'N the April Atlantic Monthly I raised doubts as to certain aspects of the then uncompleted Nuremberg trial. Since that time I have had a chance to profit from comments of Mr. Justice Jackson, Professor Sheldon Glueck, Professor Max Radin, Professor Lon Fuller, an anonymous contributor to the July, 1946, Law Quarterly Review, and other writers; I have also read reports of the trial and have studied a summary of the judgment. This further investigation has led me to resolve some of my earlier doubts, and I hope that if I state my own change of views I may contribute to the thinking of others who are concerned about the great questions raised by this trial.

The doubt which seemed to critics of the Nuremberg trial most fundamental was whether the defendants could properly be held to answer a charge that they had engaged in "the crime of aggressive war." Was there any such substantive offense?

Many who replied affirmatively contended that "the crime of aggressive war" was no different from

the specific war crimes (such as killing a captured enemy civilian) that had been defined in the Hague Convention of 1907. That is, they argued that waging an aggressive war was a crime that had been outlawed by a specific treaty or treaties; and that individuals who engaged in such conduct, like individuals who engaged in the slaughter of captured civilians, were triable by any tribunal established for the occasion by a warring power, and were punishable by any penalty prescribed for the occasion by that power.

That argument seems to me unsound. It does not seem to me that an examination of the pre-war treaties, conference proposals, diplomatic correspondence, and juristic writings shows that there was a specific international covenant that individuals who waged an aggressive war were criminals in the same sense that there was a specific international covenant that individuals who killed captured civilians were criminals.

But it is not sufficient to stop with that purely There remains this inquir analytical approach. planners of an aggre HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Those who believe tention. First, they a planned this war both

Papers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files

In the Atlantic for last April Chanters B. Wyzanski, Jn., Judge of the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts, expressed his doubts about the validity of the Nuremberg trial. In the interval his misgivings have been cleared anny for reasons as forthright as they are conscientious.

THE WHITE HOUSE

December 23, 1952

HEMORANDUM TO GENERAL LANDRY:

Attached is a letter from Professor Cate of the University of Chicago asking clarification of the precise circumstances under which the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

If this letter is to be answered, it may take some research in official files and discussion with the President. Since this is an Air Force project, perhaps it would be more appropriate if you checked into this thing.

If, when the information is available, you wish us to write a reply, we will be glad to do so.

IRVING PERLMETER

Attachment

WHE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON 30 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President, it would be very desirable, if you could do it, to let this historian have such information as could be used in the history that he is writing concerning the circumstances under which the first atomic bombs were dropped.

R. B. ANDRY

Incl

President's Secretary's Files

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO 37 . ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

December 6, 1952

The President Juman
Washington, D. C.



Sire

For several years it has been my privilege to serve as one of the editors and authors of The Army Air Forces in World War II, a history published on a non-profit basis under the joint sponsorship of the U.S. Air Force and the University of Chicago. One of my tasks for the fifth volume, now in press, was to write an account of the atomic bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In respect to the decision to use the bomb I have been faced with an apparent discrepancy in the evidence which I have been unable to resolve, and, in spite of a reluctance to intrude upon the time of the President, I am turning to you for information for which you are the best and perhaps the sole authority.

I have read with great interest your own statements - that released on 6 August 1945 and that contained in your letter to Dr. Karl T. Compton, dated 16 December 1946 and published in the Atlantic Monthly of February 1947. I have read also the late Mr. Stimson's more detailed account in Harper's Magazine of February 1947 which is in perfect accord with yours - the gist being that the dread decision for which you courageously assumed responsibility was made at Potsdam win the face of Premier Suzuki's rejection of the warning contained in the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July, and that the motive was to avoid the great loss of life that would have attended the invasion of Kyushu scheduled for November.

More recently I have seen a photostatic copy of the directive to Gen. Carl Spaatz ordering him to deliver the first atomic bomb against one of four designated targets; the document has been declassified and I am inclosing a true copy. The letter is dated at Washington on 25 July 1945 and bears the signature of Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Acting Chief of Staff during General Marshall's absence at Potsdam. According to General Arnold's statement elsewhere /H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 5897, this directive was based on a memorandum dispatched by courier to Washington after a conference on 22 July between himself, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall.

The directive contains an unqualified order to launch the attack was soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945."

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Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

There is no reference to the Potsdam Declaration which was to be issued on the next day and no statement as to what should be done in the event of a Japanese offer to surrender before 3 August. It is possible that the written directive was qualified by oral instructions, or that it was intended that it be countermanded by a radio message if the Japanese did accept the Potsdam terms, or that the directive was an erroneous representation of Secretary Stimson's real intentions. Nevertheless, as it stands the directive seems to indicate that the decision to use the bomb had been made at least one day before the promulgation of the Potsdam Declaration and two days before Suzuki's rejection thereof on 26 July, Tokyo time. Such an interpretation is in flat contradiction to the explanation implicit in the published statements, that the final decision was made only after the Japanese refusal of the ultimatum.

Because of the extraordinary importance of this problem, I am appealing to you for more complete information as to the time and the circumstances under which you arrived at the final decision, and for permission to quote your reply in the volume of which I have spoken. Your well-known interest in history has encouraged me to seek my information at the source, as the historian should, without apology other than for having intruded on your crowded schedule with a letter made overly long by my desire to state the problem accurately.

Very truly yours,

James d. Cate

James L. Cate

Professor of Medieval History

JLC:jm Inclosure

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF Washington 25, D. C.

25 July 1945

TO: General Carl Spaatz Commanding General United States Army Strategic Air Forces

- l. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will penuit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshina, Kokura, Migata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.
- 2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.
- 3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiques on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.
- 4. The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Minitz for their information.



/S/ Thos. T. Handy THOS. T. HANDY General, G.S.C. Acting Chief of Staff

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Papers of Harry S. Trumen President's Secretary's Files

WASHINGTON Dec. 31, 1952 My dear hopeson Cate: Your letter of tec. 6th 1952 has just now feen delipered to use. When the energage cause to lots. daru that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in Key Kexico, there was much excitement and consection about the effect on the won they in progress with Japan. The next day Hold Prime this. Stoling that the explosion had been a success. The British Primeting reter understood and appreciated what I'd told hun Prime Kinister Staling suited and tracked we THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files

for reporting the explosion to him but I'va suce he did not understand its eignificance. I called a sace ting of the Sec. of State the Byrnes, the Sec of War Mr. Sticuson adia Leady, Jea Mar. Shall gen Eisenhower the Dec of the Nary, adm King and some others to discuss what should be done with this aiful weapon. Fasked Gen Marchall what it would cost in lives to landon in Japan It was his opinion that 14 million casualities would be the minimum cost as well as an equal unifer of the energy. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Fapers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE the other midstany and waral weapresentagreed. Jacked Dec. Strinson which cities in Japan were desorted executively to wan production. He seat an ultinatumto Japan & stas ignored. Torder fatoric forals doped on the tero esties manued on we were in the middle of the Atlanti Ocean Dropping the Lorals laded the war, saved lives and pase THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

the free nations a chance to face the facts. When it looked as if Japan would quit, Ruseia humed surrender so as to be in at the settleraent. No military contribution was made by the Ruseiano toward sictory oser Japan. Prisoner esere surrendered and Hanchuria occupied as was Horea worth of the 38th parallel. Ruseia in Rein Las been a great liability since] THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

> Papers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files

January 2, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LIOYD:

There are two points in the President's draft which should be changed. On page 2, it is stated: "I asked Gen. Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plane and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that i million casualties would be the minimum cost as well as an equal number of the enemy." Stimson says in his book On active Service, p. 619: "We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone." I think it is important that the President's casualty figure be changed to conform with that of Secretary Stimson, because presumably Stimson got his from Gen. Marshall; the size of the figure is very important.

On page h, it is stated: "When it looked as if Japan would quit, Russia hurried into the fray nine days before the surrender so as to be in at the settlement." Actually, Russia announced her decision to enter the Japanese War on August 8, effective August 9; the surrender of Japan was tendered on August 1h. Therefore, the statement should be amended to read "five days before the surrender" or "less than a week before the surrender."

In his letter to the President, Professor Cate calls attention to the directive of July 25, 1945 from Gen. Handy to Gen. Spaatz, containing an unqualified order to launch the atomic bomb attack. Professor Cate asks whether this directive does not contradict published statements that the final decision was made only after the Japanese refusal of the ultimatum.

According to Dr. Andolph Winnacker, Historian of the Office of Secretary of Defense, it is clear that the Gen. Handy order could have been countermanded in the event Japan had responded to the Potsdam ultimatum — just as any military order can be countermanded. The fundamental decision to use the bomb preceded the Gen. Handy letter, and the decision to "trigger" its use and define the targets was made by the President as indicated in his memorandum. I do not feel this needs elaboration.

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KENNETH W. HECHLER

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman President's Secretary's Files

January 5, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LLOYD:

Dr. Winnacker called regarding the dropping of the atomic bombs, and said that all his records show are that General Groves reported on the effectiveness of the bomb test in New Mexico, reporting on July 21, and Secretary Stimson and others at Potsdam conferred daily with the President on July 22, July 23, and July 2h. Presumably Secretary of the Navy Forrestal was not present at the conference to which the President refers inassuch as he did not arrive at Potsdam until July 28 at 5:00 P. M. The only other information which Dr. Winnacker has is that the operation, initially scheduled for August 3, was postponed on two occasions (presumably due to weather).

Dr. Winnacker says that Admiral Dennison has all of the Potsdam papers, which Winnacker believes it will be necessary for us to look at in order to get a conclusive answer to the questions raised by the President's note.

Roberta Harrows says that the President left Washington for Potsdam on July 6 at 11:00 P. M., arrived on July 15, departed on the return trip on August 2 at 8:00 P. M., and arrived in Washington, D. C., on August 8 at 10:50 P. M. The Potsdam Conference actually lasted during the days July 17 to August 2, 1945.



K. W. H.

January 5, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LLCYD:

Supplementing my previous note on the conversation with Dr. Winnacker, Gordon Arneson of the Department of State (an adviser on atomic energy) states that the order from General Handy to General Spaatz was necessary because orders had to be cut in advance and the wheels had to be set in motion, even though the final decision on dropping the bomb was necessarily in the hands of the President.

Arneson does not have a full list of the participants in the meeting at Potsdam, but he feels that Harvey Bundy, special assistant to Secretary Stinson on atomic matters, was present. Winnacker feels that McCloy may have been present, but he has no way of checking.

Armson is sure that the President made the decision to drop the bomb at the last minute, on the way back from Potsdam.

He has no information on the selection or elimination of targets at the Potsdam meeting other than what Stimson says in his book about the elimination of Kyoto.

Bundy may have some information on this according to Arneson; Bundy is now with the law firm of Chote, Hall and Stewart in Boston.



KENNETH W. HECHLER

January 6, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At your request I have reviewed your draft letter to Professor Cate, and I have made a few slight revisions after checking the details.

In your draft, you state that General Marshall told you that a landing in Japan would cost a quarter of a million casualties to the United States, and an equal number of the enemy. Mr. Stimson, in his book written by McGeorge Bundy, says that Marshall's estimate was over a million casualties. Your recollection sounds more reasonable than Stimson's, but in order to avoid a conflict, I have changed the wording to read that General Marshall expected a minimum of a quarter of a million casualties and possibly a much greater number — as much as a million.

Secretary Forrestal does not appear to have been at the Potsdam meetings until July 28, and your conferences about the atom bomb appear to have taken place early in the meeting, on July 22, 23 and 24. Accordingly, I have deleted the Secretary of the Navy from the list of those with whom you conferred.

I have also inserted a paragraph explaining why the orders to General Spaatz were dated July 25 rather than after the ultimatum. This has been checked with the historian of the Department of Defense.

Russian entry into the war was less than a week before the surrender.

I have deleted the last sentence of your draft, since I think that it might be unfairly used by the propagandists of the political opposition. It states a fundamental truth, but in a very restrained way, and it seemed to me that it might raise more problems than it would help.

I attach various memoranda to me on this subject from Kenneth Hechler who did the research.



DAVID D. LIDED LAND

January 12, 1953

Mr. Theres.

My dear Professor Cates

Your letter of December 6, 1952 has just now been de-

When the message came to Potsdam that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much excitement and conversation about the effect on the war then in progress with Japan.

The next day I told the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Generalisaino Stalin that the explosion had been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him. Premier Stalin smiled and thanked me for reporting the explosion to him, but I'm sure he did not understand its significance.

I called a meeting of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of Mar, Mr. Stimson, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Misenhower, Admiral King and some others, to discuss what should be done with this swful weapon.

I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million, on the American side alone, with an equal number of the enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed.

I asked Secretary Stimson which cities in Japan were devoted exclusively to war production. He promptly named Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among others.

We sent an ultimatum to Japan. It was rejected.

I ordered atomic bombs dropped on the two cities named on the way back from Potsdam, when we were in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

In your letter, you raise the fact that the directive



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to General Speaks to prepare for delivering the bomb is dated July twenty-fifth. It was, of course, necessary to set the military wheels in motion, as these orders did, but the final decision was in my hands, and was not made until we were returning from Potsdam.

Dropping the bombs ended the war, saved lives, and gave the free nations a chance to face the facts.

When it looked as if Japan would quit, Enssis hurried into the fray less than a week before the surrender, so as to be in at the settlement. No military contribution was made by the Russians toward victory over Japan. Prisoners were surrendered and Hanchuria occupied by the Soviete, as was Korea, north of the 38th parallel.

Sincerely yours,

(Sed) HARRY S. Thutan

Professor James L. Cate, Department of History, The University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.



THE ATOMIC BOMB




On April 25, 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had an appointment with the Fresident at the White House. Stimson later, in his book "On Active Service In Peace And War" wrote:

"When Stimson went to the White House on April 25, 1945, to discuss the atomic bomb with a President from whom hitherto the matter had been kept secret, he took with him a memorandum which dealt not so much with the military use of the bomb as with its long-range political meaning."

In his book Stimson quoted the memorandum as follows:

- *1. Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible meapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.
- "2. Although we have shared its development with the U.K., physically the U.S. is at present in the position of controlling the resources with which to construct and use it and no other nation could reach this position for some years.
- "3. Nevertheless it is practically certain that we could not remain in this position indefinitely.
- widely known among many scientists in many countries, although few scientists are now acquainted with the whole process which we have developed.
- who. Although its construction under present methods requires great scientific and industrial effort and raw materials, which are temporarily mainly within the possession and knowledge of U.S. and U.K., it is extremely probable that much easier and cheaper methods of production will be discovered by scientists in the future, together with the use of materials of much wider distribution. As a result, it is extremely probable that the future will make it possible to be constructed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a large nation in a much shorter time.
- "h. As a result, it is indicated that the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and naterial power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one. . . .
- "5. The world in its present state of noral advancement compared with its technical development would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization night be completely destroyed.



- "6. To approach any world peace organization of any pattern now likely to be considered, without an appreciation by the leaders of our country of the power of this new weapon, would seen to be unrealistic. No system of control haratofore considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thorough-going rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never heretofore contemplated.
- The thermore, in the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations. Also our leadership in the war and in the development of this weapon had placed a certain neral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further.
- weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved.




In outlining the history of the development of the atomic bomb in his book, Stimson referred to a paper which he published in February, 1947, in Harper's Magazine and he quoted at length from that article.

He said that it was in the Fall of 1941 that the question of atomic energy was first brought directly to his attention. At that time President Henry Roosevelt appointed a consisting of Vice President/Mallace, General Marshall, Dr. Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institute of Washington, Er. James B. Comant, President of Harvard University and himself to advise the Fresident on questions of policy relating to the study of nuclear fission which was then proceeding both in the United States and Great Britain. He said that from May 1, 1943, until his resignation as Secretary of War on September 21, 1945, he was directly responsible to the President for administration of the entire undertaking with General Marshall, Bush, Comant and Major General Leslie R. Groves, the Officer-in-charge of the project, as his chief advisor.

He said the policy adopted and steadily pursued by Roosevelt and his advisors was to spare no effort in securing the earliest possible successful development of an atomic weapon. The original experimentalischievement of atomic fission, he pointed out, had occurred in Germany in 1938 and it was known that the Germans had continued their experiments. In 1941 and 1942 they were believed to be shead of us and it was vital that they should not be the first to bring atomic weapons into the field of battle.

"At no time, from 19hl to 19h5," Stimson wrote, "did I ever hear it suggested by the President or by any other responsible member of the Government that atomic energy should not be used in the war." He said the entire purpose of the project was production of a military waspon; "on no other ground could the war-time expenditure of so much time and money have been justified."




Stimson, in addition to general supervision of the work of General Groves, became Chairman of a combined policy committee, composed of British and American officials and responsible directly to the President and Prime Minister Churchill.

Until 19hh, Stimson said work on the atom was financed from funds
"elastically" available from other appropriations but as expenditure increased it was decided that direct appropriation would be necessary. Therefore, in February, 19hh, Stimson, Marshall and Bush took it up with Speaker
Rayburn and Representatives McCormack and Martin, Democratic and Republican
Leaders of the House, who piloted the necessary appropriation through the
House without public discussion. A meeting in June with Senators Barkley,
White, Bridges and Thomas of Oklahoma, brought similar results in the Senate.
In 1945 additional large appropriations were likewise obtained.

Stimson said that as time went on it became clear that the weapon would not be available in time for use in an European war and that war was successfully ended without it. In the Spring of 1945, however, it became evident that the climax of the effort was nearing but it was impossible to state with certainty that success had been achieved until a bomb was actually exploded. A test was to be made at the Alamogordo Reservation in New Mexico.

Con March 15, 1945, Stimson said he had his last talk with President
Roosevelt. He said he took with him a memorandum which the President had
sent him from an unnamed person "who had been alarmed at the runors of extravagance in the Manhattan Project." This man suggested that a body of outside scientists be formed to pass upon the project because there were rumors
that Bush and Conant had "sold the President a lemon on the subject and
ought to be checked upon." He said it was a rather jittery and nervous memorandum and rather silly but that he was prepared for it and gave the President a list of the scientists who were actually engaged on the project to
show their high standing. The list he said comprised four Nobel prize men




and practically every physicist of standing. He said he then outlined the future of it, and "went over with him the two schools of thought that exist in respect to the future control after the war of this project, in case it is successful, one of them being the secret close-in attempt to control the project by those who control it now, and the other being the international control based upon freedom both of science and of access." He told him that those things must be settled before the first projectile is used and that he must be ready with a statement to come out with the people on it just as soon as that is done. He agreed to that."

He said the conversation covered the three aspects of this question then uppermost in their minds -- first that it was always necessary to suppress a lingering doubt that such a titanic undertaking could be successful; second the implications of success in terms of a long-range post-war effect; third the problem that would be presented at the time of the first use of the weapon, for with that first use he said there must be some public statement.

Destin

In April, Stimson set up a committee, charged with the functions of adyear vising the President on the various questions raised "by our apparently inminent success in developing an atomic weapon." The committee, known as the Manhattan Committee consisted of Stimson as Chairman, George L. Harrison, who acted as Chairman in Stimson's absence; James F. Byrnes, then a private citizen, as personal representative of the President; Ralph A. Berd, Under Secretary of the Mavy; William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research & Development, and President of the Carnegie Institute of Washington; Dr. Carl 7. Compton, Chief of the Office of Scientific Research & Development, and President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, and President of Harvard University.




The committee's work included the drafting of statements issued immediately after the first bombs were dropped, preparation of a bill for
demestic control of atomic energy, and recommendations looking toward intermstional control of atomic energy.

On June 1st, this committee recommended that the bomb be used against Japan, without specific warning, as soon as possible and against such a target as to make its devastating strength clear.

Stinson wrote that an advisory panel of the distinguished atomic physicists reported that they could propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war -- "we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." Stimson said that the conclusions of the committee were similar to his own although he reached his independently and he felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Japanese Emperer and his military advisors there must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing truth of our power to destroy the Empire. He felt such an effective shock "would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost." He set forth an argument in support of his opinion which opinion he said was held not only by himself but by all his senior military advisors.

In July, 1965, although Japan had been seriously weakened, he said there was no indication of any weakening in the determination to fight rather than to accept unconditional surrender. Estimates of the War Department General Staff indicated that the Japanese army had a total strength of about five million men and there was a warm possibility that the Japanese Government might determine upon resistance to the end which would face the Allies with the task of destroying an armed force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft. Plans of the armed forces for the defeat of Japan had been prepared without reliance upon the atomic bomb. They included an intensified sea and air blockade, strategic air bombing through the summer and early fall to be




followed on November 1st by invasion of the southern island of Kyushu. This to be followed by an invasion of the main island of Honshu in the Spring of 1946. The total United States military and naval force of five million men would be involved. He said they estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to a conclusion with major fighting it would not end until the latter part of 1946 at the earliest. With these thoughts in mind he wrote a memorandum for the President on July 2nd. This was prepared after general discussion and agreement with Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy Forcestal. He said this was prompted not by the problem of atomic energy but by American desire to achieve a Japanese surrender without invading the home island.

Program For Japan's and did not mention the atomic bomb. It would propose a carefully-timed warning to Japan before any invasion of the Empire was attempted. He said there was much discussion in Washington about the timing of this warning and that the controlling factor in the end was the date set for the Potsdam Conference. He said it was President Truman's decision that such a warning should be issued by the United States and the United Kingdom from this meeting, with the concurrence of the Head of the Chirace Government so that it would be plain that all Japan's enemies were united. This was done in the Potsdam ultimatum of July 26th. On July 28th, the Japanese Premier rejected the ultimatum.

The New Mexico test of the atomic bomb occurred on July 16th while the President was at Potsdam.

He said a list of suggested targets for the atom bomb was made up and he approved four, including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The former was bombed on August 6th and the latter on August 9th.

Report prepared by Fban Ayers, White House Assistant, ca. 1950-51



the same as you would an armored division to go around on the ground and cause the surrender and as you say when you go to win a war it takes the foot soldier, the armored division and artillery on the ground no matter what sort of weapons you have. It was the estimate of General Marshall that this action would probably save the lives of 250,000 of our soldiers and probably twice as many casualties - that was what I was trying to avoid.

Hillman - what the professor is trying to get at is despite the plastering from the air the ordinary bombs on Germany and Japan wouldn't have the a ffect of a knock-out blow.

Truman - the atomic bomb was the knock-out blow the same as the armored division would have on the ground behind the enemy.

Royse - Mr. Stimson in his book says he urges a psychological blow which would perhaps be the means of making the Japanese give in and he keeps talking about that.

Truman - that is all right and, of course, in the long run
it takes the psychological condition of the enemy's mind to cause a
surrender but my objective was to use the atomic bomb purely as a
military blow to create a military surrender. That in the long run is
what happened. In the first world war if you will remember the Germans
were not completely defeated - Germany was never invaded and never

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end but the fact that nine hundred thousand Americans had marched

up to _____ and were about to take over caused them to surrender.

They never would have surcendered otherwise. I don't believe in

speculating on the mental feeling and as far as the bomb is concerned

I ordered its use for a military reason - for no other cause and it saved

the lives of a great many of our soldiers. That is all I had in mind.

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CITY OF HIROSHIMA HIROSHIMA, JAPAN

March 1, 1958

Mr. Harry S. Truman Indianapolis, Missouri U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Truman:


Please find enclosed a copy of the English translation of the resolution made by the City Council of Hiroshima in connection with the statement you recently made concerning the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and on the hydrogen bomb.

The people of Hiroshima, who actually suffered the painful sting of the bomb, are naturally most keenly sensitive to the moral side of the nuclear weapons. It is our regret that your statement has urged us to make the resolution which we hereby forward you for your consideration.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Tsukasa Nitoguri

Chairman Hiroshima City Council



RESOLUTION NO. 11

RESOLUTION TO DECLARE PROTEST AGAINST BROADCAST REMARKS OF MR. TRUMAN, FORMER UNITED STATES PRESIDENT

The citizens of Hiroshima who have led their life in tribulation of more than two hundred thousand lives taken in sacrifice consider it their sublime duty to be a cornersione of world peace and hold that no nation of the world should ever be permitted to repeat the error of using nuclear weapons on any people anywhere on the globe, whatever be the reason.

If, however, the statement made by Mr. Truman, former President of the United States, that he felt no compunction whatever after directing the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that hydrogen bombs would be put to use in future in case of emergency be true, it is a gross defilement committed on the people of Hiroshima and their fallen victims.

We, the City Council, do hereby protest against it in deep indignation shared by our citizens and declare that in the name of humanity and peace we appeal to the wisdom of the United States and her citizens and to their inner voice for peace that said statement be retracted and that they fulfil their obligations for the cause of world peace.

Be it hereby resolved.

February 13, 1958

Hiroshima City Council

Submitted February 13, 1958.

By KAZUO MATSUSHITA, Hiroshima City Councilman YOSHITO AMIMOTO YOSHIO YOSHINAKA KIYIOCHI TSUCHIOKA MEJICHI MASUMURA

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The following letter was written March 12, 1958, by former President of the United States Harry S. Truman to Hon. Tsukasa Nitoguri, Chairman of the Hiroshima City Council, Hiroshima, Japan, in reply to the resolution passed by the Hiroshima City Council protesting Mr. Truman's recently televised comments on the dropping of the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your courtes is letter, enclosing the resolution of the Hiroshima City Council, was highly appreciated. The feeling of the people of your city is easily understood, and I am not in any way offended by the resolution which their city council passed.

However, it becomes necessary for me to remind the City Council, and perhaps you also, of some historical events.

In 1941, while a peace conference was in progress in Washington between representatives of the Emperor of Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States, representing the President and the Government of the United States, a naval expedition of the Japanese Government approached the Hawaiian Islands, a territorial part of the United States, and bombed our Pearl Harbor Naval Base. It was done without provocation, without warning and without a declaration of war.

Thousands of young American sailors and civilians were murdered by this unwarranted and unheralded attack, which brought on the war between the people of Japan and the people of the United States. It was an unnecessary and terrible act.

The United States had always been a friend of Japan from the time our great Admiral succeeded in opening the door to friendly relations between our two countries.

Our sympathies were with Japan in the war between Russia and Japan in the early 1900's. The President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, intervened and brought about a peace settlement.

But in the 1930's Japan joined the Axis Powers, and when the Hitler regime in Germany and Mussolini's government in Italy were defeated, Japan was left alone.

From Potsdam in 1945, before Russia declared war on Japan, Great Britain, China and the United States issued an ultimatum suggesting that Japan join the Germans and Italians in surrender. This document, sent to the Japanese Government through Sweden and Switzerland, evoked only a very curt and discourteous reply.

Our military advisers had informed Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain,

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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China and the President of the United States that it would require at least a million and a half Allied soldiers to land in the Tokyo plain and on the south island of Japan.

On July 16, 1945, before the demand for Japan's surrender was made, a successful demonstration of the greatest explosive force in the history of the world had been accomplished.

After a long conference with the Cabinet, the military commanders and Prime Minister Churchill, it was decided to drop the atomic bomb on two Japanese cities devoted to war work for Japan. The two cities selected were Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

When Japan surrendered a few days after the bomb was ordered dropped, on August 6, 1945, the military estimated that at least a quarter of a million of the invasion forces against Japan and a quarter of a million Japanese had been spared complete destruction and that twice that many on each side would, otherwise, have been marmed for life.

As the executive who ordered the dropping of the bomb, I think the sacrifice of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was urgent and necessary for the prospective welfare of both Japan and the Allies.


The need for such a fateful decision, of course, never would have arisen, had we not been shot in the back by Japan at Pearl Harbor in December, 1941.

And in spite of that shot in the back, this country of ours, the United States of America, has been willing to help in every way the restoration of Japan as a great and prosperous nation.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Harry S. Truman

Honorable Tsukasa Nitoguri Chairman Hiroshima City Council Hiroshima Japan



HARRY S. TRUMAN The world is faced with a situation that means either total destruction or the great lot. The decision must be made and it must be made as soon as possible. The great nations and the great peoples of the earth have all been through trials and great difficulties down through the ages. They have bught each other for soverighty and control do as with the explosion of they resources all that has feen old concepts and old ideas

Down through the ages there have been men whose concept of life was to live creditally and to help others to live happily. The Chinese the East Tradians, the austians, the Jeus and the comparatively modern day Christians have produced ideas and moial codes fac! the ideal of wear living to gether in Karinory. Guell these great ideas have Leen exploited by selfish rules and behanched priesthoods for

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HARRY S. TRUMAN whom the great idealist muted to Kelp. Now we are faced with total destruction The old Hehren Prophets presented the idea of the distruction of the world by fire after their presentation of a destruction by water. Welt that distriction is at hand unless the great leaders of the world present it. Two thousand assercian Scien tist have present an appeal to the government and Peoples of

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FROM THE DESK OF HARRY S. TRUMAN the World to the tresident of the United States Eleven housand screatist from forty nine nations have presented to the Lecretary Percent of the united totions in this year of 1958 a stong of their fortaneous concern bouth weclear threat to humatity. Those of the world who still believe in morality and justice are in the sait majority. That is true not only in the free nations but it is true in Ruslia in China, in Spain in Portugal, in the near East, in

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FROM THE DESK OF HARRY S. TRUMAN South america when Victoris queside. The leader of one of the great nations whose roice ean he heard and listaned to should go to the Researtly of the United Astions and adrocate an internationalcon trof of unclear energy in the interest of all maka kind. He should advocate an international police for the enforcement of control and the maistainance of peace in the Kear East, the Far East,

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the Pacific, the atlantic and all around the world No little dictor any where should be permited to op. prees his own people or to use the methods of a demagage to upcet the peace of the world and tring about its Complete destrution. These rules to apply to the tig distant aut to all hations free or store all around the world-and the maybe destruction by fire

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It is up to own leaders.



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